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Urbanisation as a threat or 
opportunity in the promotion of 
human wellbeing in the 21st century 
David Satterthwaite and Diana Mitlin 
 
Introduction 
It is possible to present a credible picture of urbanisation as one of the greatest threats to human 
health, wellbeing and development, although this paper will argue that to do so requires focusing 
on a limited set of cities. There is a stronger evidence base on cities and urbanisation 
underpinning good health, fulfilment of civil rights, democracy and freedom from deprivation, 
although with important exceptions. It is possible to present urbanisation as the most serious 
driver of human-induced climate change (and of most other kinds of ecological damage). But 
cities also have the potential to be places where high living standards can be delinked from 
unsustainable ecological footprints and high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (and there are 
some cities that demonstrate this). Of course, a very different set of urban centres get highlighted, 
depending on which of these points one wants to substantiate. What this paper seeks to do is to 
highlight both the threats and the opportunities posed by urbanisation. 
What we know about urbanisation 
The world’s urban population has increased nearly five-fold since 1950. Urban centres now 
include more than half the world’s population compared to 29 per cent in 1950 and 15 per cent in 
1900. It is within urban centres that most of the world’s GDP is generated and most new 
investments are concentrated. Table 1 summarises the statistics for urban populations and urban 
trends for different regions from 1950 to 2010 – and projected up to 2030 and 2050. 
Many aspects of urban change in recent decades are unprecedented, including not only the 
world’s level of urbanisation and the size of its urban population, but also the number of countries 
becoming more urbanised and the size and number of very large cities. Of the 449 cities in the 
world with populations of 750,000 plus in 2010, 52 had populations that had grown more than 
twenty-fold since 1960, with 116 having populations growing more than tenfold. Table 1 also 
highlights how rapidly China has urbanised since 1990; 34 of these 116 cities with populations 
growing more than tenfold since 1960 are in China. 
Urban areas in the global South now have close to two-fifths of the world’s total population and 
close to three-quarters of its urban population. The global South also has most of the world’s 
large cities. By 2011, there were 23 ‘mega-cities’ (cities whose population exceeds 10 million) 
and only five were in high-income nations (two in Japan, two in USA, one in France). Of the 
remaining 18, four were in China, three in India and two in Brazil. 
The increasing concentration of the world’s urban population and of its largest cities outside the 
nations with the highest incomes is a change from the historic pattern where these have been 
concentrated in the most prosperous nations. Table 1 shows the large decrease in the proportion 
of the world's urban population in high-income countries and regionally in Europe since 1950 and 
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Table 1: The distribution of the world’s urban population by region, 
1950–2010 with projections to 2030 and 2050 
Major area, region, country or area 1950 1970 1990 2010 
Projected 
for 2030 
Projected 
for 2050 
Urban population (millions of inhabitants) 
 World 745 1,352 2,281 3,559 4,984 6,252 
  More developed regions 442 671 827 957 1,064 1,127 
  Less developed regions 304 682 1,454 2,601 3,920 5,125 
  Least developed countries 15 41 107 234 477 860 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 20 56 139 298 596 1,069 
 Northern Africa 13 31 64 102 149 196 
 Asia 245 506 1,032 1,848 2,703 3,310 
  China 65 142 303 660 958 1,002 
  India 63 109 223 379 606 875 
 Europe 281 412 503 537 573 591 
 Latin America and the Caribbean 69 163 312 465 585 650 
 Northern America 110 171 212 282 344 396 
 Oceania 8 14 19 26 34 40 
Percentage of the population in urban areas 
 World 29.4 36.6 43.0 51.6 59.9 67.2 
  More developed regions 54.5 66.6 72.3 77.5 82.1 85.9 
  Less developed regions 17.6 25.3 34.9 46.0 55.8 64.1 
  Least developed countries 7.4 13.0 21.0 28.1 38.0 49.8 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 11.2 19.5 28.2 36.3 45.7 56.5 
 Northern Africa 25.8 37.2 45.6 51.2 57.5 65.3 
 Asia 17.5 23.7 32.3 44.4 55.5 64.4 
  China 11.8 17.4 26.4 49.2 68.7 77.3 
  India 17.0 19.8 25.5 30.9 39.8 51.7 
 Europe 51.3 62.8 69.8 72.7 77.4 82.2 
 Latin America and the Caribbean 41.4 57.1 70.3 78.8 83.4 86.6 
 Northern America 63.9 73.8 75.4 82.0 85.8 88.6 
 Oceania 62.4 71.2 70.7 70.7 71.4 73.0 
Percentage of the world’s urban population 
 World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  More developed regions 59.3 49.6 36.3 26.9 21.4 18.0 
  Less developed regions 40.7 50.4 63.7 73.1 78.6 82.0 
  Least developed countries 2.0 3.0 4.7 6.6 9.6 13.8 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 4.1 6.1 8.4 11.9 17.1 
 Northern Africa 1.7 2.3 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 
 Asia 32.9 37.4 45.2 51.9 54.2 52.9 
  China 8.7 10.5 13.3 18.6 19.2 16.0 
  India 8.5 8.1 9.8 10.6 12.2 14.0 
 Europe 37.6 30.5 22.0 15.1 11.5 9.5 
 Latin America and the Caribbean 9.3 12.1 13.7 13.1 11.7 10.4 
 Northern America 14.7 12.6 9.3 7.9 6.9 6.3 
 Oceania 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Source: Derived from statistics in United Nations (2012). 
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the very large increase in low- and middle-income countries (and regionally in Asia with more 
than half this in China). In 1950, the nations that now make up Europe had nearly two-fifths of the 
world’s urban population; now they have around 15 per cent and they may have less than 10 per 
cent by 2050. 
It is also worth noting the scale of the growth in the urban population in the global South. If we 
take 1975 as a time when there was a growing concern that rural poverty was being ignored, 
between 1975 and 2010 the urban population in the global South tripled (growing by 1.8 billion) 
while the rural population grew by 38 per cent (848 million). By 2010, among the regions in the 
global South with more than half their population in urban areas were northern and southern 
Africa, eastern and western Asia and the Caribbean, Central America and South America. In 
1970 only Central and South America were in this category. 
But these urban statistics tell us nothing about the very large and complex economic, social, 
political and demographic changes that have underpinned them. These include the growth in the 
world’s population and the multiplication in the size of the world’s economy, the shift in economic 
activities and employment structures from agriculture to industry and services (and within 
services to information production and exchange), and the virtual disappearance of colonial 
empires. The changes also include globalisation and the network of cities around the world that 
are the key centres of production and the key command and control centres (Sassen 2006) – and 
this network of cities includes many of the world’s most rapidly growing cities over the last few 
decades. There are also limitations in the data available on urban populations – see Box 1 
 
Box 1: Limitations in data about urbanisation 
There are at least three serious limitations in the population data about urbanisation. The first 
is the number of nations that have had too few censuses to provide an accurate picture of 
urban change over time. Many nations have had three or fewer censuses in the last 60 years, 
some have only had one or two. For these, many of the statistics on their urban population and 
level of urbanisation are based on estimates and projections. The United Nations’ datasets on 
urban populations (see United Nations 2012) have long cautioned against interpreting these as 
if they were from census data, and their reports specify what censuses have been drawn on for 
each nation – but these reservations are often overlooked. The second limitation is the 
differences in the ways that national governments define their urban populations; for most 
nations, the proportion of their population living in urban centres can go up or down by several 
percentage points, depending on the criteria chosen to define urban centres. In almost all 
nations, all settlements with 20,000 or more inhabitants are considered urban but there are 
very large differences in how the population in settlements smaller than this are allocated 
between rural and urban areas. For many nations, a population threshold is used – for instance 
urban centres are settlements with 1,000 inhabitants or 2,500 or 5,000. So in the many nations 
where a significant proportion of the population lives in settlements of between 1,000 and 
5,000 inhabitants, whether these are classified as (rural) villages or small urban centres 
influences urban population statistics. The third limitation in the data is the different ways in 
which city boundaries are set. For most large cities, there are three or four different boundaries 
in use – for instance, the built-up area, the administrative boundary, the metropolitan area and 
the metropolitan region. Population statistics for some cities are based largely on their built-up 
area and do not include settlements close by from where many inhabitants commute to the 
city. For others, especially Chinese cities, the boundaries are set much more widely and often 
include substantial rural populations too. The population of London would increase by several 
million (and it would be a mega-city) if its boundaries were set in ways similar to major Chinese 
cities. These limit the accuracy of international comparisons. 
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To have detailed statistics on how urban populations change for any nation over several decades 
does not mean that we understand the underpinnings of such change. The spatial distribution of 
urban populations reflects where private investment and political power are concentrated. We 
learn about the social, economic and political underpinnings of urbanisation from a few detailed 
historically rooted analyses of urban change in particular nations and these remind us how 
complicated and varied such change is; they consistently emphasise the influence of economic 
trends on urban dynamics. Also, how much those dynamics can vary within a nation (and over 
time) and the complex mix of local, regional and international economic, social and political 
influences on urbanisation – along with the influences brought by demographic changes (see 
Hasan and Raza 2002; Martine and McGranahan 2010; UNCHS 1996). Reading these should 
also encourage more caution in international comparisons of urbanisation that are so often 
dogged by inadequate knowledge of the countries being compared and inadequate appreciation 
of the deficiencies in the statistics used for comparison (or their lack of comparability). 
In most cities, there are constant changes in patterns of in- and out-migration, reflecting mostly 
changing patterns of economic opportunity and labour markets. Within major cities, there are 
usually large differences between districts or local government areas in patterns of in- and out-
migration; there may be some common patterns here as in the tendency for central areas of large 
cities to have lower population growth rates or even population declines and with areas of rapid 
population growth concentrated in particular areas – often through the expansion of informal 
settlements. Even in nations that are urbanising rapidly, there is usually great diversity between 
urban centres in their population growth rates. China has among the world’s most rapid increase 
in its level of urbanisation in recent decades and many of the world’s fastest-growing cities yet it 
also has many cities that have declining populations. 
Aggregate urban statistics may suggest rapid urban change, but an analysis of population growth 
rates for all urban centres in a nation usually shows a large proportion that are not growing 
rapidly. Those that grow rapidly get noticed; those that do not get overlooked. Over 20 years ago 
we highlighted how the attention to mega-cities overlooked the fact that these actually 
concentrated only a small proportion of the world’s population and that many mega-cities had 
more people moving out than in (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989). This is still the case. Looking at 
the world’s 20 largest cities in 2010, 11 had population growth rates below 1.5 per cent per year 
for 2005–2010, with five having population growth rates below 1 per cent. None had population 
growth rates above 4 per cent per year. The proportion of the world’s population living in mega-
cities has grown from 2.7 per cent in 1990 to 4 per cent in 2000 and 5.1 per cent in 2010. 
One reason for this is that most mega-cities are being challenged by a new generation of smaller 
cities that compete with them for new investment – for instance, in Mexico, Brazil, China and 
India; this may reflect some of the dis-economies of inadequately managed agglomeration. There 
are interesting parallels to this in the USA as new large cities in the south came to draw new 
investment away from the long-established large cities in the northeast. In Brazil, cities such as 
Curitiba and Porto Alegre have attracted new investments away from the mega-cities of São 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In India, cities such as Hyderabad, Bangalore, Surat and Pune have 
attracted new investment away from long-established large cities such as Kolkata, Mumbai and 
Chennai. However, some of these new cities will themselves become mega-cities. 
Urbanisation and economic change 
Although urbanisation is so often seen as ‘a problem’, especially where it overwhelms 
government capacities to manage it, what needs stressing is that, globally, there is an economic 
logic underpinning urbanisation and the growth of most large cities. In almost all nations, the 
increase in their level of urbanisation tracks the increase in the proportion of GDP generated by 
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industry and services and the increase in the proportion of the workforce in industry and services 
(Satterthwaite, McGranahan and Tacoli 2010). It is generally the nations with the best economic 
performance that have urbanised most over the last 30 years. Most new capital investments and 
most new employment opportunities are concentrated in urban areas – or, more accurately, in 
particular urban areas (to which there are also generally the largest migration flows). The world’s 
largest cities are heavily concentrated in the world’s largest economies – even if not all of these 
are among the economies with the highest per capita incomes. For instance, China is the world’s 
second largest economy and India the fourth largest and these two nations have a high 
concentration of the world’s largest cities. In 2010, the world’s five largest economies had 43 per 
cent of the world’s cities with more than a million inhabitants, close to half the cities with 5–9.9 
million and half the cities with ten plus million inhabitants. 
In addition, all the world’s wealthiest nations are predominantly urban1 and virtually all the low- 
and middle-income nations that have urbanised most over the last few decades have had long 
periods of rapid economic growth and large shifts in the structure of their economy and 
employment from agriculture, forestry and fishing to industry and services. There are nations or 
regions within nations where there have been rapid migration flows to urban areas (or particular 
cities) that are not in response to economic growth – including some related to civil strife or civil 
wars (which result in people fleeing to urban centres and/or refugee camps that become urban 
centres) or to rural impoverishment or disasters. But this does not alter the fact that most 
urbanisation is linked to economic growth.2 Political change has also produced major changes in 
levels of urbanisation – perhaps most dramatically when controls imposed on rural dwellers’ right 
to move to or work in urban areas are removed – for instance in China or with independence for 
many African nations. If the political changes in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s and its 
subsequent economic success and integration in the world economy had not taken place, the list 
of the world’s largest cities and the scale of the world’s urban population would have been quite 
different today. 
Projections for a nation’s urban population or a city’s population to 2030 or beyond must be 
viewed with caution. The world’s level of urbanisation in 2030 will be much influenced by the 
economic performance of the larger-population low- and middle-income nations between now and 
then. Changes in a city’s population between now and 2030 will be much influenced by its 
economic performance. Few economists would dare to predict how well the economy of a nation 
or a city will perform up to 2030 or beyond. Many of the UN population projections for the world’s 
largest cities made in the 1970s and 1980s for 2000 proved to be spectacularly wrong (see 
Satterthwaite 2007, 2010). 
Issues raised 
Three key environment and development issues are raised by an increasingly urbanised world. 
The first is the extent to which living and working in urban areas is associated with good health, 
lack of deprivation and, beyond this, wellbeing. The second is the extent of urbanisation’s 
association with unsustainable levels of resource use or degradation (such as loss of soil, forests, 
biodiversity) and increased GHG emissions. The third issue is the opportunities that urbanisation 
presents for reducing poverty and why these have so often not been acted on. 
                                                 
1  Furthermore, most rural areas in these nations have been ‘urbanised’ in terms of employment structures as most of the 
rural population do not work in agriculture, forestry or fishing, with many commuting to urban jobs or to industry and service 
enterprises that locate in rural areas or telecommuting. 
2  It is important to distinguish between growth in urban populations and growth in levels of urbanisation. Nations’ urban 
populations can be growing rapidly from natural increase even as the level of urbanisation increases slowly or not at all. 
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Urbanisation and poverty 
If we review aggregate data for nations on health and on key health determinants, globally there 
is an association between better health and higher levels of urbanisation – for instance, in regard 
to higher life expectancies, lower infant and child mortality rates and the extent to which 
populations are served with water piped to their homes and good-quality sanitation. There is also 
generally an association between higher levels of urbanisation and stronger democracies, 
especially stronger democratic institutions at the local level. There are important exceptions as 
will be discussed below – but they are exceptions. Mega-cities or other large cities may appear 
chaotic but most have life expectancies and provision for piped water, sanitation, schools and 
healthcare that are above their national average (although aggregate statistics for each mega-city 
can hide a significant proportion of their population living in very poor conditions). Some of world’s 
fastest-growing cities over the last 50 years also have among the best standards of living within 
their nation (Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2001, Satterthwaite 2007). This is what would be 
expected if there is a strong association between level of urbanisation and per capita income, and 
between increases in the level of urbanisation and economic growth. 
But the extent of the association between better health and higher levels of urbanisation depends 
heavily on the quality, competence and accountability of urban governments, and on their access 
to resources. At the risk of generalising about what is very diverse, within low- and some middle-
income nations, there is often an urban advantage (over rural areas) in living conditions where 
there are competent, accountable urban governments and an urban disadvantage where there 
are not. This is especially the case for low-income groups which may make up 50 or more per 
cent of the urban population. 
Even if most new investment and employment opportunities over the last few decades have been 
concentrated in urban areas, there has still been a rapid growth in the number of low-income 
urban dwellers. Most of the benefits of economic growth in terms of higher incomes have gone to 
non-poor groups (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2012). Certainly, the scale of urban poverty today is 
much larger than it was in the mid-1970s – and the proportion of the world’s population with 
inadequate incomes who live and work in urban areas has certainly increased. But we do not 
know by how much because of the inadequacies in the international measurement of poverty. 
The dollar-a-day poverty line is much the most widely used measure of poverty for international 
comparisons. Unfortunately, it is very unrealistic even when adjusted for purchasing power parity 
because it makes so little allowance for non-food needs. In cities, access to almost all non-food 
needs is monetised; a review of studies on expenditures by low-income households showed that 
in the more successful cities, these costs are relatively high, especially where government 
provision is poor (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2012). Housing usually has to be paid for (rents often 
taking a high proportion of income). Water has to be purchased from vendors, kiosks or tankers 
because there is no piped provision to households. Access to toilets is also limited, sometimes 
expensive and almost universally of poor quality. Education and healthcare are also often 
expensive, especially where there is no public provision for these; for many low-income groups, 
so too are transport costs as they live in peripheral settlements because rents are lower or 
squatting is possible there. Apply the dollar-a-day poverty line and, in many urban locations, 
poverty almost disappears since it is so unrealistically low in relation to the costs of non-food 
needs. According to World Bank dollar-a-day poverty line statistics (Ravallion, Chen and 
Sangraula 2007), by 2002 there was virtually no urban poverty in China, the Middle East, North 
Africa, East Europe or Central Asia and very low levels of urban poverty in Latin America. Poverty 
lines that reflect the real cost of avoiding deprivation show much higher levels of poverty – even 
in China (Solinger 2006) and even more so when the 100 million plus urban residents who have 
not managed to get registered as urban residents are considered. Studies in urban areas in 
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Zambia (Chibuye 2011), Cairo (Sabry 2010) and Buenos Aires (Hardoy and Almansi 2011) show 
the multiple substantive deprivations faced by households in informal settlements whose incomes 
are well above the dollar-a-day poverty line. 
In most low-income and many middle-income nations, levels of child mortality and undernutrition 
are still very high among urban populations. For instance, it is common for more than a fifth of all 
urban children to be stunted – see Table 2 (at the end of this paper). The proportions are much 
higher for their low-income urban populations. In India, within the least wealthy quartile of the 
urban population, more than half of children are stunted (Agarwal 2011). Within the urban 
population of many low-income nations, it is common for under-five mortality rates to exceed 100 
per 1,000 live births. Again, the rates among low-income urban populations are likely to be much 
higher. For instance, the under-five mortality rate in the informal settlements in Nairobi that house 
half the city’s population was 151 per 1,000 live births in 2000 – around twice the average for 
urban areas in Kenya and nearly three times the average for Nairobi (APHRC 2002). 
There is very little data on illness and injury among urban populations but certain studies show 
the health burdens faced by low-income urban dwellers and their devastating impacts. A study in 
informal settlements in Dhaka showed the extent to which ill health caused deterioration in 
households’ financial status. In any month, 30–40 per cent of households reported days lost due 
to illness and this led to reductions in income and increased expenditures; often more loans taken 
out, assets sold and some adults resorting to begging (Pryer 2003). Among rickshaw pullers in 
Dhaka, all of whom live in informal settlements, much the most common cause of crisis was 
health-related (Begum and Sen 2005). Two-fifths of the rickshaw pullers interviewed had been ill 
in the month prior to the interview. Each episode of illness on average cost six days income 
(combining cost of treatment and work days lost). More than half of pullers have no savings and 
no assets, one-fifth are unable to secure three meals a day, half cannot generate any surplus 
from income and a similar proportion has outstanding debt. 
Is it urbanisation or poor governance that is the problem? 
It is not urbanisation that produces the ill health and premature death summarised above but the 
failure to develop the systems of (mostly local) governments and governance that urban 
populations need. What are today the highest-income nations all had long periods when they 
urbanised without good health and what today would be termed development; this can be seen in 
the very low life expectancies and very high infant and child mortality rates in their urban centres 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century 
(Bairoch 1988). London and New York were as poorly governed as cities such as Nairobi or 
Kinshasa are today. At this time, there was often an urban penalty – that is, life expectancies and 
infant and child mortality rates higher in urban areas than rural areas. But over time, city and 
municipal governments developed with more competence and capacity to address the most 
serious health threats and also with more accountability (for instance through universal franchises 
and elected city governments). Progress was slow and full of political conflicts but it depended in 
large part on lower-income populations organising and becoming effective at making collective 
demands. Part of it was also underpinned by the acceptance of non-poor groups of the need to 
improve water, sanitation and solid waste collection to avoid epidemics (especially cholera) and 
the disruption these brought to city economies (Rosenberg 1962). The value of competent, 
accountable local governments acting in the public good became obvious – and the advantages 
that private enterprises secured from such action (both for reducing their direct costs and 
improving the quality and reliability of their workforce) also became evident. What removed the 
urban penalty was the developing competence and capacity of elected local governments, and 
the willingness of elected national governments to support this. 
 8 
In cities in high-income nations and some in middle-income nations, there are at least five areas 
where the state came to act in the public good. 
1. Universal provision of services that are a public right regardless of a person’s income 
(schools, street cleaning, emergency services, policing/rule of law, suffrage, measures for 
disaster risk reduction) although these are paid for by taxes. 
2. Universal provision of services that are paid for but affordable for most (healthcare, public 
transport, water piped to the home, sewer connections for each building, solid waste 
collection, electricity). 
3. Universal provision of standard infrastructure – storm and surface drainage systems, paved 
roads and paths, street lighting, piped water. 
4. Appropriate standards for environmental health and safety in homes and workplaces, traffic 
management and consumer protection with institutions able to ensure compliance. 
5. Social insurance (such as pensions) and social assistance (such as safety nets) for those 
who are unemployed or unable to work. 
Most of these are provided by local (city or municipal) governments or local offices of higher 
levels of government or overseen by them. There are also mechanisms and institutional channels 
that can be used by those who are denied any of the above. Perhaps the most important lesson 
from high-income nations is the importance of citizen pressure and civil society organisation 
within each nation and locality in getting the political, legislative and institutional changes that 
produced these. 
In the global South, there are many nations where only a small proportion of their urban 
population benefit from the five areas listed above. Many such nations are predominantly rural – 
although most have urban populations that are growing rapidly. To get a sense of the contrasts in 
the extent to which the urban population is healthy and has basic infrastructure and services, 
there are four indicators available for the urban populations of a relatively large number of 
countries: under-five mortality rates, percentage of children stunted (height for age below 2 
standard deviations), proportion of the urban population with water piped to their premises, and 
proportion of urban population served by electricity. The data on water piped to the premises 
come from UNICEF and WHO 2012 and is for 2010; the data on the other indicators come from 
demographic and health surveys held since 2003. The accuracy of this comparison between 
nations is limited by the fact that the year for the data for three of these indicators varies (from 
2003 to 2010), and governments use different criteria to define and measure their urban 
populations (see Box 1). There are also worries about the accuracy of some such statistics – for 
instance did the household surveys that produced them include informal settlements? Since 
these settlements are often not included on official maps and have no official addresses and 
those doing the surveys fear entering such settlements, probably not; some of these figures seem 
high compared to data from such informal settlements. In addition, to have water piped to one’s 
premises does not mean that the supply is necessarily regular or of good quality. 
If we consider which nations have urban populations with very high under-five mortality rates 
(over 100 per 1,000 live births), a large proportion of children stunted (20–35 per cent), at least 60 
per cent without water piped to their premises and at least 40 per cent lacking electricity, Mali, 
Niger, Zambia, Liberia, Congo DR, Benin, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Malawi fall into this 
category. It is likely that Chad, Burkina Faso and Mozambique would also be in this category – 
but there are no data on child stunting for their urban populations. Nigeria would be in this 
category except for a relatively high proportion of its urban population with electricity. Tanzania 
only avoids being in this category by having an under-five mortality rate at 95 per 1,000 live births 
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and thus just below the threshold. Most of these nations are among the least urbanised nations – 
and none had more than half their population in urban areas. 
Most of these nations also have among the lowest per capita gross national income (GNI) in 2010 
– for Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Congo DR, Niger and Malawi below $1,000; among 
these, the nation with the highest per capita GNI was Nigeria at $2,170. Some of these nations 
have under-five mortality rates for their urban populations of much more than 100 (Mali 158, 
Sierra Leone 167) and some have provision for electricity much lower than the chosen threshold 
(see Table 2). 
For all these nations, available data suggest that most of their urban populations also lacked 
adequate sanitation and storm and surface drainage. There are no statistics for urban sanitation 
that measure who has sanitation to a standard that greatly reduces risks of faecal-oral diseases. 
But for dense cities, it is difficult to achieve high standards for sanitation without sewers. There 
are no sewers in most urban areas in these nations and many others in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia. The following cities have no sewers or have sewers that reach a very small proportion of the 
population – Addis Ababa, Bamako, Benin, Brazzaville, Dar es Salaam, Douala, Ibadan, Kaduna, 
Kinshasa, Kumasi, Lagos; Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi, Port Harcourt and Yaoundé.3 All these cities 
have more than a million inhabitants and many have several million. It is possible to have good-
quality sanitation in some urban contexts without sewers (although it requires a significant 
investment). Most of the cities named have large proportions of their population living in dense 
informal settlements that do not have provision or room for septic tanks or good-quality, easily 
serviced pit latrines. These households also lack the income required for such investment, and 
many rent rooms from landlords and hence could not invest more even if they had the income. 
If we were to consider nations where performance on these four indicators is significantly better – 
among their urban populations, under-five mortality rates below 50 per 1,000 live births, fewer 
than 10 per cent of children stunted, more than 80 per cent with water piped to their premises and 
more than 90 per cent with electricity, then Dominican Republic, Jordan, El Salvador and 
Colombia fall into this category. Nicaragua nearly does – but 10.1 per cent of urban children are 
stunted. Perhaps also Morocco (but no data were available on child stunting among its urban 
population). Cambodia, Egypt and Guatemala would be in this category except for child stunting 
that is above the 10 per cent threshold. None of these nations has per capita GNIs below $2,000 
and some are as high as $9,000. This group of nations is generally more urban; Cambodia is the 
exception here. Jordan, Colombia and Dominican Republic are more than two-thirds urban. 
If the thresholds for the four indicators were set much higher – under-five mortality rates below 10 
per 1,000 live births, fewer than 5 per cent of children stunted and 99–100 per cent with water 
piped to their premises and electricity – then all high-income nations would be in this category. 
And all are predominantly urbanised. 
It may be that the most serious developmental problems associated with urban areas are where 
urbanisation levels are low because the economy is too weak to sustain an increasingly 
urbanised economy. But also where there is no competence or capacity among urban 
governments. Figure 1 shows the percentage of the urban population with water piped to their 
premises plotted against average national per capita income. The proportion of the urban 
population with water piped to their premises is higher, the higher the country’s per capita 
income. Above a per capita income of $5,500, in almost all nations, 80–100 per cent of the urban 
population had water piped to their premises. But there are very large differences in the 
proportion of the urban population so served for nations with per capita incomes between $2,000 
                                                 
3  A useful new source of data on the inadequacies in provision for water and sanitation in cities of sub-Saharan Africa is at 
www.iwawaterwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Articles/AfricanCitiesSanitationStatus. 
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and $5,500, which suggests the significance of political determinants, in addition to income levels. 
Many of the Latin American nations with per capita incomes in this range have 90 or more per 
cent of their urban population with water piped to their premises. Among the nations with per 
capita incomes of between $2,000 and $5,500 with half or less of their urban population so 
served are India, Sudan, Mongolia, Angola and Indonesia. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of the urban population with piped water to their 
premises in 2010 against per capita Gross National Income (purchasing 
power parity) in 2010 
 
Source: Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2012); the water supply statistics are from UNICEF and WHO (2012); the per capita GNI 
statistics from World Development Indicators. 
 
One of the most famous books on health is Where There is No Doctor (Werner 1992). This 
guides individuals on how to respond to serious illnesses or injuries if there is no healthcare 
service they can access. But what can low-income urban dwellers do ‘where there is no 
government’ in regard to basic service provision – where there is no water piped to their home, no 
connection to sewers, no electricity, no storm and surface drains, no collection of household 
wastes, no public healthcare or emergency services and often even no schools? Usually no or 
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only intermittent policing. No public space for recreation or children’s play. No secure tenure. No 
safety nets. Many of their settlements are not recorded in city surveys or registered on city maps. 
Access to water is only through its purchase from vendors or kiosks at high prices; a widely used 
alternative is shallow wells that are often contaminated. Access to sanitation is often either to 
public toilets (often expensive, with long queues and poorly maintained), to defecation in the open 
or resort to ‘flying toilets’ or poorly constructed pit latrines. Just how dire this situation is, is hidden 
by the inadequacy of basic data. For instance, households are often classified as having access 
to piped water when they can only get this from water kiosks that are expensive, have limited 
opening hours, are sometimes a considerable distance away and often have queues. Or they 
may have piped water but the water is of poor quality and only flows for a few hours each day or 
each week. 
Most commentaries on global urban change include a concern that sub-Saharan Africa is 
urbanising rapidly (or even at unprecedented rates) and this is why urbanisation has 
overwhelmed local government capacity. All the nations with the worst performance in the four 
indicators in Table 2 are in sub-Saharan Africa. Does this mean that they are urbanising without 
economic growth and without better provision for their urban population? But some care is 
needed on this issue because the lack of census data for many nations means we do not know 
whether they are urbanising. The careful review of data for the region by Deborah Potts suggests 
that much of the region has not been urbanising rapidly in the last decade or two (see Potts 
2009). UN statistics also suggest that sub-Saharan Africa was not urbanising as rapidly as had 
been previously stated or expected. The rate of increase in the level of urbanisation was much 
more rapid in Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa for 1990 to 2000 and for 2000 to 2010 (United 
Nations 2012). 
Rapid population growth is sometimes put forward as the reason for very poor living conditions in 
cities in sub-Saharan Africa. But cities in this region do not have unprecedented population 
growth rates – and actually many of the cities with the fastest population growth rates over the 
last 100 years are in North America (Satterthwaite 2010). It may be that many cities in sub-
Saharan Africa have had higher than average population growth rates relative to economic 
growth because of high rates of natural increase. This can be suggested as a reason why the 
deficits in provision for infrastructure and services are so high, although the failure of national 
governments and international agencies to support local government capacities to manage urban 
growth seems a more valid explanation. Many cities in Asia and Latin America that have grown 
faster than most sub-Saharan African cities have managed better in ensuring provision for 
infrastructure and services. 
It is possible to focus on particular cities or city districts where there is no local governance that 
serves the public good and use these as the basis for suggesting a very bleak urban future – as 
in Mike Davis’s book A Planet of Slums (Davis 2006). There are also many cities where the 
development of competent accountable local governments seems politically impossible, 
especially in areas with civil conflict (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers 2011). There is the evidence 
summarised already in regard to the devastating levels of premature death and avoidable illness 
and injury. There are also the case studies of particular cities or city districts that show very high 
levels of civil conflict and violence (see Esser 2004; Moser 2004; Rodgers 2004). These might be 
taken to suggest an urban future associated with poverty, violence and civil strife. But it is 
misleading to present these as if they are the norm. As described below, there are alternative 
experiences that demonstrate how new forms of urban governance are addressing these 
problems. Given the scale of deprivation faced by so much of the urban population in low-income 
and many middle-income nations, perhaps the puzzle is that there is not far more violence and 
civil conflict. A critical factor may be the relatively low levels of inequality in at least some urban 
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centres. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) suggest that while there is a relationship 
between violent crime and inequality, there is not with the level of urbanisation. 
There is a literature on urbanisation as a cause of ecological degradation that underpins conflict 
and civil wars although this was never really sustained by strong empirical evidence (there was 
often a confusion between environmental health risks and ecological degradation). There is also 
a literature on how cities provide concentrations of disenfranchised and marginalised youth that 
are then used and manipulated for political violence and civil conflict. But clearly the quality of 
local governance matters here in that where there are opportunities for youth and measures to 
support their political inclusion, they make major contributions to city economies (Mabala 2011). 
Cities and ecological crises 
Successful cities tend to draw on increasingly distant sources for food, raw materials and water. 
Their populations and enterprises also import most goods that are energy-, pollution-, land-, 
waste- and water-intensive. This means that they are not affected by the ecological costs 
generated by the production of these goods. The concept of cities’ ecological footprints (Rees 
1992) helped clarify this – as this calculated the productive land area that a city (or a nation) 
draws on from ‘distant elsewheres’ for the food and resources used by its enterprises, institutions 
and residents and for absorbing the GHG emissions generated. The concept makes clear the 
very large ecological footprint that large and wealthy cities have and how there is no longer the 
biological capacity within the earth to allow other cities to expand their ecological footprints 
(Wackernagel, Kitzes, Moran, Goldfinger and Thomas 2006). Other measures have also sought 
to make clear the ecological implications of high consumption levels – for instance the measuring 
of virtual water (the water needed to produce the goods consumed) or food miles or energy or 
material flows that support cities. 
Cities are often viewed as among the most intractable problems in regard to GHG emissions, 
especially in a world that is urbanising. Cities are often said to be responsible for 75–80 per cent 
of all GHG emissions, although drawing on IPCC figures, it is likely that around 40 per cent of 
global emissions come from within urban boundaries (Satterthwaite 2008). However, it is not 
urban centres that are responsible for anthropogenic GHG emissions but particular activities, 
enterprises, institutions and consumption patterns in both rural and urban areas. There are also 
the difficulties in where GHG emissions get assigned. Does fuel loaded into aircraft in 
international airports get assigned to the city where the aircraft are located? For those who 
commute by car into cities, does their fuel use get allocated to their home or their workplace? Do 
the emissions used in the fabrication, transport and sale of goods get allocated to where those 
goods were made or where they are consumed? It has become common to compare GHG 
emissions between cities – but the level of emissions for any city is influenced by whether these 
include the emissions generated by making the goods that are sold and used elsewhere (see 
Dhakal 2004). For London, a shift from production-based to consumption-based accounting for 
GHG emissions increases the average Londoner’s responsibility for GHG emissions from 6 to 12 
tonnes of CO2e (equivalent) a year (Bioregional and London Sustainable Development 
Commission 2010). 
At present, the only data available for GHG emissions for a range of urban centres are for 
emissions generated within their boundaries. These show that very successful cities with high 
living standards have emissions per person that vary by a factor of ten. So in Figure 2, Porto 
Alegre, Oslo, Stockholm and Barcelona, all with very high living standards, have much lower 
emissions per person than most cities in North America and Australia. 
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The figures shown must be used with caution in that some of the differences will come from 
different GHG estimation methodologies (Hoornweg, Sugar and Trejos Gomez 2011). 
Rotterdam’s very high level of emissions per person is probably because it counts the fuel for 
ships supplied in its large international harbour. Some of the cities with the lowest emissions per 
person are also cities with climates for which there is little or no need for space heating and 
cooling. The low-scoring wealthy cities are not there because of city commitments to reducing 
emissions but because of ways they developed (for instance compact patterns encouraging more 
trips to be made by walking, bicycling or public transport) and whether the electricity they use 
comes from hydropower, nuclear power, or fossil-fuelled power stations. Some may reflect city 
and national government commitments to energy-efficient buildings – and the low figures for 
successful Brazilian cities may owe this in part to the use of ethanol for motor vehicles. 
It is not urban dwellers or particular cities that are driving increasing GHG emissions but high 
consumption patterns from urban and rural households. Wealthy rural dwellers tend to have 
higher consumption patterns than city dwellers with the same income level. But what is an urban 
issue is when, where and how cities can offer a very high quality of life with average per capita 
emissions of 2–4 tonnes, not 12–30 tonnes. For the successful expanding cities in the global  
 
Figure 2: Greenhouse gas emissions per person per year for selected 
cities (in tonnes of CO2 equivalent) 
 
Source: Hoornweg et al. (2011). 
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South, how their transport and residential developments house and serve their middle- and 
upper-income groups has large implications for future GHG emissions; for instance are they 
housed in well built energy-efficient accommodation with efficient appliances and well served by 
public transport or living in energy-inefficient homes in low-density suburbs with high private 
automobile use? 
Opportunities and innovations associated with urbanisation 
The clustering of people, enterprises, transport systems and their wastes provides many potential 
advantages for a healthy city because of returns to agglomeration (including economies of scale 
and of proximity). It is cheaper per person or household to provide piped treated water, sewers, 
drains, healthcare, emergency services, schools, policing – and to ensure health and safety 
standards are met in homes and workplaces. This clustering of population and enterprises also 
provides many potential advantages for reducing cities’ ecological footprints – for instance, in 
more energy-efficient buildings, in recycling or reusing waste heat or solid or liquid wastes and in 
reducing the need for private automobile use. 
But this same clustering has many disadvantages in the absence of this infrastructure, services 
and appropriate regulations and their implementation (and in the absence of a government 
structure able to ensure their provision). Concentrate people, and most infectious and parasitic 
diseases are more easily spread. Concentrate people and production, and this concentrates their 
solid, liquid and gaseous wastes. So cities have potential advantages for health but it takes 
competent local governments to ensure their realisation. This does not mean that government 
must provide all infrastructure and services – but it does have to provide the institutional 
framework to ensure provision. 
If we review examples of where deprivations in urban areas have been substantially reduced for 
low-income groups, two paths can be identified. Although they are differentiated here, they are 
not separate processes and, in many cities, there is evidence of both paths. The first is through 
more accountable and competent city and municipal governments; the second is through 
changes driven by representative organisations formed by low-income groups that local 
governments come to accept and then to support. We are not saying that the solution lies purely 
at the local level. National (and often provincial) government support in resourced systems of 
decentralised management is critical. Our point is that effective and accountable delivery is 
managed best at the city scale. 
Examples of the first path have been most evident in many Latin American nations over the last 
three decades or so. What drove this was democratisation (in many nations from dictatorships) 
and decentralisation, much of it driven by citizen and civil society pressure. This meant that urban 
governments got more power and resources (often including stronger local revenue-raising 
possibilities) and structures that were more accountable and transparent – for instance as mayors 
and city councils came to be elected. In Brazil, this was backed by the setting up of a new 
ministry of cities. These political changes help explain why the proportion of the urban population 
with good-quality provision for water (water piped into people’s homes) and connection to sewers 
and drains increased in recent decades; it is now common for Latin American cities to have close 
to universal provision for these. They also help explain the wave of innovation in city governments 
in this region in more participatory and accountable governance. This included a new generation 
of elected mayors that came from outside the dominant political parties and who brought new 
ideas and a new commitment to reducing inequalities in infrastructure and service provision (see 
Almansi 2009; Dávila 2009). Among the examples of these changes is participatory budgeting. 
First developed in Brazil, this has been applied in over 250 urban centres around the world 
(Cabannes 2004). This gives more scope for citizen groups and community-based 
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representatives to influence priorities for local government expenditures; it also implies a local 
government budgeting system that is more transparent and available to public scrutiny. Some 
cities made special provision within participatory budgeting for groups that have particular 
difficulties getting their priorities heard (for instance, committees for women or children and 
youth). Participatory budgeting has generally meant more funding going to lower-income areas of 
a city and an increase in expenditure in social provision (for instance, drainage, education and 
healthcare). 
Democratisation and decentralisation also help explain why city and municipal governments in 
this region came to give far more attention to ‘slum’ and ‘squatter’ upgrading. This is a profound 
change in the relations between the residents of these settlements and governments, as these 
residents are seen as having the right to government-funded infrastructure and services. In the 
1970s and early 1980s, the state’s response to informal settlements was far more often to 
bulldoze them or ignore them (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989). 
Given the interest in wellbeing as a desired outcome of development, it is worth considering 
upgrading through a wellbeing lens. Many upgrading programmes have only very basic 
improvements in provision – for instance some standpipes for water (often at the edge of the 
settlement to reduce costs), some paved roads and street lighting. These are a minimum 
response to the demands of the inhabitants and not a recognition of their citizen rights and 
entitlements (see Chatterjee 2008). Costs are kept low, what is provided is still grossly 
inadequate, the residents have no say in what is done and these improvements do not include 
any measures to provide secure tenure or incorporate the residents into the wider city. 
In much of Latin America, what might be termed comprehensive upgrading is much more 
common. Here the residents of informal settlements get official (and conventional) connections to 
piped water supplies, sewers and electricity. Roads are paved and generally provision for 
healthcare and schools improve. The residents may have access to low-interest loans to upgrade 
their homes. Here the settlement gets incorporated into the city so the residents get legal 
addresses and often tenure of their plot and conventional arrangements with utilities. This 
provides a more comprehensive response to the multiple dimensions of urban poverty and 
changes how city government and utilities view the residents. Unit costs for this are much higher 
and usually subsidised. This kind of upgrading is increasingly seen as a conventional part of what 
city or municipal governments do. However, this whole process is usually organised and 
managed by government agencies with little scope for the residents to influence what is done. As 
one person from an informal settlement in Guatemala City commented about the upgrading 
programme, ‘it put a roof over my poverty’ (Diaz, Grant, del Cid Vargas and Sajbin Velásquez 
2001). Comprehensive upgrading of this kind conforms to two of the three dimensions of 
wellbeing (McGregor and Sumner 2010) – improvements in material conditions and changes in 
relations with the rest of the city and its different institutions and utilities. It does not conform to 
the third dimension – residents able to pursue and achieve goals that are important to them 
individually and collectively. 
One example of an upgrading programme that seeks to achieve all three aspects is the 
community-directed upgrading in Thailand supported by the Community Organizations 
Development Institute (Boonyabancha 2005, 2009). It arose in part from an awareness that many 
residents were not benefiting from economic growth. A national government agency, the 
Community Organizations Development Institute, provides support to savings groups formed by 
residents of informal settlements to secure tenure (negotiating with the landowner), upgrade their 
neighbourhoods and get connections to conventional trunk infrastructure. This programme 
exemplifies the symbiotic relationship between innovative government approaches and the 
agency of the urban poor. Organised networked community groups from informal settlements 
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have a major part in decision-making. As financial support for the approach has grown, the roles 
taken on by community networks have also expanded, for example in the management of loan 
finance and negotiating additional resources from local governments. 
The second path by which deprivations in urban areas have been reduced is from changes in 
local governments (and governance) driven by the organisations formed by urban poor groups. 
These include very specific local examples: a group of waste pickers negotiating a contract with 
the local government so they become part of the formal waste management system (Fergutz, 
Dias and Mitlin 2011); a savings group formed by homeless women who negotiate a plot of land 
on which they design and build homes (Manda, Nkhoma and Mitlin 2011); partnerships formed 
between the police and resident committees in informal settlements to provide policing there 
(Roy, Jockin and Javed 2004). These have gone further where there are larger membership 
organisations or federations of urban poor groups that want to work with local government, and 
where there are responsive local governments. In this path too, there has to be a recognition 
within local government that those living in informal settlements and working in the informal 
economy are legitimate (and important) parts of the city and have rights to infrastructure, services 
and local government agencies who are accountable to them. 
Today, there are national federations or networks of ‘slum’/shack/urban poor dwellers in at least 
13 nations, with city federations in six more and grassroots groups with the potential to develop 
into federations in many more nations.4 All have savings groups as the foundation of the 
federations, with most savers and savings managers being women. Many savings groups are 
engaged in initiatives – negotiating land and building houses, upgrading their settlement, building 
community toilets, and so on. All are working to survey and map the informal settlements in which 
they live because these get left out of city surveys and maps (Patel and Baptist 2012). As they 
organise and undertake surveys, mapping and enumerations, this provides the residents of each 
settlement with the basis for discussing and planning improvements and the information base for 
negotiating inclusion as local governments recognise the value and validity of the documentation 
they provide. The different federations also learn from each other and support each other in their 
negotiations with the state. This has been facilitated by the federations forming their own umbrella 
organisation, Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) that helps them visit, support and learn 
from each other and helps new city and national federations develop. 
One of the most common ways through which the federations seek to show government agencies 
and politicians their capacities is through precedent-setting projects. When federation members 
take politicians and civil servants to see the 200 or 300 houses they have built (as in Zimbabwe 
and Malawi) or the many community toilets that they designed, built and are managing (as in 
India) − with detailed costings – it has very different impacts from more conventional lobbying 
such as demanding housing. The precedent-setting projects help change the attitudes of 
politicians and civil servants to the federations; in effect, for the first time building a productive 
relationship with local government (and in many instances with national government). 
Thus, the federations develop solutions that work for their members and then get the approval 
and where possible the support of local governments to allow them to act on a larger scale. So 
the censuses and surveys of informal settlements they undertake can produce the data and maps 
needed for planning and installing infrastructure and for the residents to develop upgrading plans. 
When federations do these surveys and maps covering all informal settlements in a city, it allows 
them to work at the level of the city and work for city-wide solutions. Mapping risk and 
vulnerability for the whole city also identifies communities most at risk (see Livengood and Kunte 
2012). 
                                                 
4  For more details, see www.sdinet.org. 
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In many nations, these federation strategies have led to co-production as the federations and 
local governments work together in improving housing, infrastructure and services (Mitlin 2008). 
Here, the federations have influence in decision-making and federation groups are directly 
involved in implementation of state policy. It often includes local governments providing financial 
support (and resources such as land) to development strategies defined and undertaken by the 
federations. It might be considered second-rate compared to state provision but it is often more 
appropriate to the informality of everyday life that formalised strategies cannot support and it also 
makes limited state funding go further. Alternatives put forward by the residents in informal 
settlements to a state that has limited capacity and funding work better for them. Moreover, as the 
initial literature on co-production elaborates, even in towns and cities in the US, state provision is 
more effective if planned and delivered with the communities that are intended to benefit. 
One other example of federation−government partnerships in co-production is the setting up of 
‘police panchayats’ in informal settlements in Pune and Mumbai (Roy et al. 2004). In most 
informal settlements, there is little or no police presence and no police station. Discussions with 
those who live in informal settlements highlight how the police are often reluctant to act on any 
complaint brought to them by a resident of an informal settlement and often reluctant to go into 
informal settlements. The police in Pune and Mumbai (India) have a partnership with two 
federations who work together (the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan) to 
provide police services in informal settlements. Each police panchayat is made up of ten 
representatives from the settlement (seven women, three men) and a local police officer. The 
community also makes available a room in each settlement for the police so there is a police 
presence in their settlement and the inhabitants know the police officer that is responsible for 
policing in their settlement. The members of the police panchayats help patrol the settlement to 
maintain law and order. They also seek to resolve disputes before they escalate into violence or 
other crimes. There are over 60 police panchayats active in Mumbai and police officers and 
representatives of grassroots federations from Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe have visited 
them. 
The international network of slum/shack dweller federations and its secretariat (SDI) also has 
importance in supporting national federations to extend the range of their initiatives and help new 
federations develop. Federations often take senior civil servants or politicians with them when 
they visit other federations to show how these have developed successful partnerships with 
governments. For instance, many federations have brought politicians or civil servants to Namibia 
to see how the government accepted lower standards for housing plots (and community-provided 
infrastructure) that reduced costs, or to India to see the community policing. 
Two international initiatives have sought to support scaling up of such community-driven 
processes. Both are supportive of wellbeing in that they bring improvements in material 
conditions, encourage changes in relations between those living in informal settlements and the 
wider city and support grassroots organisations to set priorities and take charge. Both have 
received substantial support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The first is the Urban 
Poor Fund International that supports the work of the slum/shack dweller federations and is 
managed by SDI. Between 2001 (when it was set up) and 2010, this channelled around US$7 
million to over 100 grassroots initiatives in 17 nations. It produced a new way of financing 
community-led development as it was the federations that brought proposals to it and decided 
collectively on what got funded. So for once, there was an international fund that was not only 
accountable to the organisations of the urban poor but whose funding priorities were set by them. 
This Fund also demonstrates how its support could be used to encourage and leverage support 
from local and national governments which then multiply the scale of what can be done. In 2011, 
the Fund provided a further US$4.4 million to support the initiatives of SDI-affiliated federations 
 18 
with a range of activities including informal settlement upgrading, land acquisition, water 
provision, sanitation (particularly toilet blocks) and housing improvements. 
The second initiative is more recent − the Asian Coalition for Community Action set up in 2009 by 
the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR 2010; Boonyabancha and Mitlin 2012). This 
provides grants and loans direct to community organisations to catalyse and support the 
initiatives they choose as well as support for city-wide upgrading and partnerships between 
community organisations and local governments. By January 2012, with US$6 million it had 
helped fund initiatives in 708 settlements in 153 cities in 19 nations. In each city, small grants and 
loans support a range of community-led initiatives − for instance roads and walkways, drains, 
community centres and parks/playgrounds, toilets, water supply and waste management 
improvements. As these are being implemented by community organisations in many different 
settlements in each city, they encourage city-wide networks to form where members share skills 
with each other and learn to negotiate with their local governments. Further support is available 
as local governments engage and then come to support this, including the formation of jointly 
managed community development funds. 
When a few communities living in informal settlements in a city start saving, undertake surveys 
and networking and implement their first small improvement projects, these may not bring much 
change. But when these are being conceived and carried out by communities all over a city, the 
local authorities start noticing and often begin accepting these and then collaborating in small 
ways. This initiative also supports the setting up of joint city development committees that allow 
the community organisations to work as equals with their local governments and other urban 
partners. Most of the cities where the ACCA Programme (Asian Coalition for Community Action) 
is operating have some kind of committee that formalises this city−community partnership. In 
several cities in Cambodia, Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Thailand and 
Lao PDR, local governments have provided some infrastructure (such as paved access roads, 
drains, sewers, electric and water connections) and many have provided communities with 
technical help, building materials and the loan of heavy construction equipment (Boonyabancha 
and Mitlin 2012). 
How can international support actually support the local and the pro-
poor? 
Only through more competent and accountable local governments that serve the public good and 
provide more opportunities and voice for their low-income populations can urban problems be 
addressed at scale. But an important underpinning of this is urban poor groups who organise and 
make collective demands on local governments, and whose actions help convince local 
politicians and civil servants that they need to change. This is constrained by politicians and civil 
servants who still see those who live in informal settlements and work in the informal economy as 
the cause of city problems rather than as key underpinnings of the city economy. For prosperous 
cities, it also depends on whether a growing middle-class population makes demands that serve 
only its interests or the interests of the city, including those of citizens living in informal 
settlements. 
More inclusive forms of local government can also address what today seem like intractable 
problems – including providing both opportunity and voice to youth so it draws in their energy and 
innovation. Meeting ‘the needs of the present’ can include attention to urban forms that combine 
high living standards with lower GHG emissions (although most urban centres in low-income 
nations have very low emissions per person). But needed actions here are unlikely unless there 
are real commitments among high-income nations to dramatically reduce their emissions. 
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Perhaps the critical issue for national governments, international agencies or philanthropic 
organisations in regard to making cities centres of opportunity and wellbeing for their low-income 
populations is how to identify and support the local processes that move in this direction. The two 
key players in this are local governments and grassroots organisations (and, where they exist, 
federations) and the local NGOs with whom they choose to work. We know too the importance of 
civil society pressure for getting needed city reforms that can also influence national policies to 
reduce poverty. Deneulin and McGregor (2010) note the importance of institutional arrangements 
for negotiating socially coherent wellbeing outcomes and strategies; for urban centres in low- and 
middle-income nations, these have to include institutional arrangements that support the 
representative organisations formed by those in informal settlements both in what they choose to 
do and prioritise and in changing their relations with local governments and other urban groups. 
But it is very difficult for international agencies or philanthropic organisations to operate at such 
local levels and work direct with grassroots organisations and local governments – and ensure 
good use is made of their support (with full reporting on its use). What is needed for good change 
to happen at scale is their support for the intermediary institutions that really know how to work 
with and support grassroots organisations and their engagement with local government. This is 
recognised by the two internationally funded initiatives noted earlier – the Urban Poor Fund 
International and ACCA. Both recognise the need to set up and support city funds (for the 
slum/shack dweller federations these are also where their savings can be lodged) and national 
funds that are fully accountable to urban poor groups and to external funders. If only 1 per cent of 
official development assistance could learn how to support representative organisations of the 
urban poor to work with their local governments, the proportion of the world for whom urban areas 
are centres of wellbeing and opportunity would increase dramatically. 
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Table 2: Indicators of urban child health and of provision for piped water 
and for electricity 
 For these nations' urban populations Urbanisation 
level (2010) 
Per 
capita 
GNI ppp 
current 
(US$) 
(2010) 
Under-5 
mortality 
rate 
% 
children 
stunted 
% with 
water 
piped to 
premises 
% with 
electricity 
Chad 179.4  23 16 21.7 1,220 
Sierra Leone 166.8 24.5 19 13 38.9 830 
Mali 158.2 23.5 35 47 34.3 1,030 
Mozambique 143.2  19 25 31.0 930 
Niger 139.2 27.2 39 47 17.6 720 
Liberia 138 22.2 8 7 47.8 340 
Burkina Faso 136.4  23 52 25.7 1,250 
Guinea 133  29 64 35.0 1,020 
Zambia 132.2 32.9 36 48 38.7 1,380 
Congo Democratic Republic 121.7 24.2 21 37 33.7 320 
Nigeria 121.4 27.3 8 85 49.0 2,240 
Cameroon 119.3  26 77 51.5 2,270 
Benin 115.7 32.2 31 57 44.3 1,590 
Uganda 115.4 21.7 20 43 15.2 1,250 
Malawi 113.4 35.4 28 30 15.5 860 
Swaziland 107.4 16.6 74 63 21.3 5,600 
Ethiopia 98  46 80 17 1,040 
Congo Brazzaville 108  36 40 63 3,190 
Tanzania 94.5 25 22 39 26.3 1,440 
Rwanda 87.1  13 25 18.8 1,150 
Lesotho 86.2 22.2 63 26 26.8 1,970 
Pakistan 78.4  58 98 35.9 2,790 
Haiti 78 15.6 15 69 52.0 1,180 
Ghana 74.7 16 33 77 51.2 1,620 
Kenya 74.5 23.8 45 50 23.6 1,640 
Zimbabwe 77  82 79 38.1  
Senegal 67.4  75 80 42.3 1,910 
Madagascar 63.1  14 53 32 960 
Bangladesh 62.9 26.6 20 77 27.9 1,810 
India 60.6 31.1 48 93 30.9 3,400 
Namibia 59.7 20.6 72 78 37.8 6,420 
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Table 2:cont. 
 
 For these nations' urban populations Urbanisation 
level (2010) 
Per 
capita 
GNI ppp 
current 
(US$) 
(2010) 
Under-5 
mortality 
rate 
% 
children 
stunted 
% with 
water 
piped to 
premises 
% with 
electricity 
Bolivia 54.9 11.6 95 94 66.4 4,640 
Azerbaijan 52.2 11 78 100 53.4 9,280 
Nepal 47.1 21.4 53 90 16.7 1,210 
Morocco 38.1  89 95 56.7 4,600 
Indonesia 37.8  36 98 49.9 4,200 
Dominican Republic 36.9 6.6 80 99 69.1 9,030 
Nicaragua 34.6 10.1 89 95 57.3 2,790 
Guatemala 33.7 27.3 96 94 49.3 4,650 
Jordan 31.9 11.5 93 99 82.5 5,800 
Cambodia 28.7 21.1 63 67 19.8 2,080 
Egypt 28.7 23 100 100 43.4 6,060 
Philippines 27.7  61 92 48.6 3,980 
Armenia 26.4  98 100 64.1 5,660 
Colombia 20.6 7.9 92 99 75.0 9,060 
El Salvador 18.5 8.8 80 97 64.3 6,550 
Albania 12.5 20.6 91  52.3 8,520 
Sources: Under-five mortality rates, percentage of children stunted and percentage with electricity from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys and accessed at http://statcompiler.com/; water piped to premises from UNICEF and WHO (2012); per capita 
GNI (ppp) from World Development Indicators; level of urbanisation from United Nations (2012). Nations included are those for 
which there are data for at least three of the first four indicators and with the data being between 2003 and 2010. 
